The G7 Leading Technology Develop Program (G7 Program), a national R&D program (NRDP) in Korea that was funded during the years between 1992 and 2001, served as a cornerstone in boosting Korea's major industries such as semiconductor, information & communications, electronics, and automobile. Overall, this program has been recognized as a typical success model of large-scale government-wide NRDPs from the technology planning phase to the commercialization planning phase. Now more than a decade has passed since the G7 Program ended. This paper at this moment aimed to examine strategies to promote the effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs with the G7 Program as a case study. The conceptual scope of the effectiveness of technology transfer covered the overall macroscopic outcome of NRDPs rather than microscopic outcomes, and this study explored the pathway of technology planning of the G7 Program and the success rates of G7 projects. In so doing, we reached the conclusion that strategic planning helped promote the effectiveness of technology transfer by identifying future-oriented and promising R&D items that held the potential for leading their own markets, thereby translating their R&D outcomes into commercialization.
Introduction
Korea has been investing in R&D as its top policy priority to develop and nurture key technology over the years. National R&D Programs (NRDP) initiated in 1982 constitute one of the policy tools for the Korean government in making R&D investment, and have driven the nation's economic development while creating national growth engines. Korea's R&D investment measured against GDP amounted to 4.15% in 2013, which places Korea at the top among all OECD members. The Korean government accounts for approximately 25% of this while the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning and Ministry of Health and Welfare are playing a leading role in undertaking wide-ranging R&D programs on a governmental level. NRDPs are generally designed to support R&D in the pre-commercialization phase. In numerous cases, however, the success of R&D achieved through NRDPs is not translated into success in the following commercialization phase, which increasingly fuels the need to improve the efficiency of NRDPs. DeCotiis & Dyer adopted five perspectives of producibility & business potential, technological results, efficiency, workforce development and technological innovation in assessing program outcomes on a subjective scale, and mentioned that the effectiveness of technology transfer of any NRDPs could be considered as one viable perspective taken to review program outcomes [1] .
Meanwhile, NRDPs that consist of dozens or hundreds of projects have rarely been a subject of research conducted to examine the relationship between the quantitative outcomes of NRDPs and their effectiveness of technology transfer. Instead, studies undertaken in Korea primarily focused on the assessment of research outcomes (Comprehensive Assessment of G7 Leading Technology Development Program (G7 Program)), success stories (NRDP review and analysis) and success factors. For instance, Hong et al. suggested that factors related to the implementation of governmental R&D programs interact with one another and influence research outcomes [2] . Concerning the implementation structure of these programs, Hong et al. listed such key factors that affect research outcomes as project selection mechanisms, assessment on research actors, implementation modes (single mode, phased-in mode), time scope(short-term, mid/long-term) and management and assessment. The features of researchers and research projects, the implementation structure of research projects, incentive systems, and socio-economic background have impact on the research outcomes of governmental R&D projects. Ahn et al. classified Next Generation Growth Engines Program by implementation type (led by private sector businesses, jointly led by the government and private sectors, and led by the government), and identified main success factors that may be present in the R&D process (planning -execution -commercialization) by respective modes of implementation [3] . Ahn et al. intensively analyzed appropriate promotional strategies and market launching tactics in the commercialization phase.
This study aims to look at the effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs from the perspective of 'aggregate and effective transfer of outcomes'. Additionally, this study examines the concrete cases of planning the G7 Program so as to clarify differences when NRDPs are planned with or without taking into account the effectiveness of technology transfer. In so doing, this study will enable us to discover strategic implications in relation to improving the aggregate effectiveness of technology transfer of NRDPs.
Fundamental Logic behind the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of NRDPs
Park et al. categorized the strategic management models of large-scale NRDPs into technology innovation strategy and technology innovation management system [4] . Technology innovation strategy refers to the selection, acquisition and use of technology to identify certain strategic areas (technology areas) with big potential, conduct R&D to secure technology required for technological innovation, and make the most use of acquired technology to generate fruitful outcomes. Meanwhile, any technology innovation management system refers to managerial systems and processes to support such strategy and often concerns the structured operational framework identified to support the implementation of NRDPs. Such strategic management model demonstrates that R&D projects can be successful when the advocacy of technology innovation strategy and the efficiency of technology innovation systems are systematically aligned together. Regarding NRDPs' effectiveness of technology transfer, this, in turn, favors the macroscopic approach that highlights such performance indicators as technological and commercial outcomes, technological and industrial development and the growth of stock (knowledge creation and dissemination), rather than the microscopic approach that focuses on technological outcomes on a project level.
Fig. 2. Conceptual Framework to Analyze the Effectiveness of NRDPs in Technology Transfer: Basic
Framework(Micro Analysis) and Extended Concept(Macro Analysis) [4] In principle, the effectiveness of NRDPs in technology transfer concerns a process that follows the generation of research output. Souder et al. defined technology transfer as the process of movement of technology from one entity to another [5] . In short, this is the process of technology moving from its developers or suppliers to those who demand such technology, or the process of technology moving from one department to another department. Camp & Sexton defined technology transfer as the transfer of technological knowledge, the process of delivering research outcomes to potential users and the route of technological ideas or know-how from the initial conceiving organization to the user organization [6] . In addressing the issues of technology transfer and commercialization of NRDPs, however, it is necessary that we extend the concept of effectiveness of technology transfer. That is to say, from the viewpoint of transformation or dissemination made to meet the 'intended purpose' of NRDPs (e.g. strengthening innovation capacity or improving national competitiveness) it is recommended that this concept be expanded to include the production and transfer of aggregate knowledge stock.
Taking the aggregate perspective shows that the success or failure of individual projects is influenced by diverse factors from the identification of individual projects that comprise NRDPs (including the identification of promising technology) to technology transfer and commercialization strategies and project management capacity. Attarzadeh & Ow presented the following three resolution types of research projects: first, project success (Resolution Type 1) means that the project is completed on-time, on-budget and fulfills all functions and features as specified; second, project challenged (Resolution Type 2) means that the project is completed and operational but over-budget, over the time estimate, and offers fewer functions and features than originally specified; third, project impaired (Resolution Type 3) means that the project is cancelled at some point during the development cycle for some reason [7] . Attarzadeh & Ow demonstrated that project success accounts for a mere 16.2% of the total while project challenged and project impaired account for 52.7% and 31.1% respectively. The success of NRDPs would be determined by whether their 'intended purpose' was satisfied through the success of individual research projects. This implies that the success rate of individual projects that constitute an entire NRDP can be used as a proxy indicator.
Effectiveness of Technology Transfer of the G7 Program

Key Outcomes of the G7 Program
One prime example of Korea's NRDPs is the G7 Program. This program was initiated in 1992 on a government-wide level as a way to overcome the economic and industrial difficulties in the late 80's, and its deadline was clearly defined as the year 2001 [8] . Since its features and goals were defined in a strategic and detailed manner during the planning stage, the G7 Program was a "mission-oriented" program. At the time of launching the G7 Program back in 1992, a total of 18 G7 projects were selected: nine product technology development projects and another nine platform technology development projects. Out of these 18 projects, five of them were completed: one high-definition TV project in the 1 st phase, two projects concerning new medicine and agricultural chemicals and next-generation semiconductors in the 2 nd phase, and two projects concerning next-generation flat panel display and ASIC(application-specific integrated circuit) in the 3 rd phase. Ultimately, 13 projects were undertaken until the set end-point [9] .
To assess these G7 projects, interim monitoring research was conducted in respective phases in 1995 and 1998. Nevertheless, this research was limited to micro-level assessments designed to determine whether individual projects would be "continued, supplemented or discontinued" and was highly "procedural" in its nature as an intermediate step to decide on the continuity of these projects into their next phase [10] . As a result of the final assessment and comprehensive review of G7 projects[11], one of them was graded highly excellent (next-generation flat panel display), 14 were graded excellent, one average and one below average. Regarding 14 excellent projects, the key assessment criterion was whether these projects successfully reached their initial target in the fields of semiconductors, BT, ET, precision machining, high-speed trains and next-generation automobiles. One human sensibility ergonomics project was identified as average due to the lack of consistency between the final R&D target and implementation strategy, and one next-generation superconducting project was rated below average due to its failure to attain the set target.
Overall, the G7 Program has been considered as successful until now, and CDMA, high-density memory, and flat panel TVs represent some of the technologies developed through the G7 Program that became Korea's flagship export products in the early 21 st century [10] . Specifically, DRAM and CDMA technologies generated KRW 192.9 trillion in revenues by 2004, which far exceeds KRW 380.0 billion that was invested in their R&D, thereby contributing to the creation of national wealth as well as employment to a greater extent [12] . In the comprehensive assessment on G7 Program conducted by Ajou University and KISTEP, seven projects were chosen to analyze their outcomes by using analytical categories and indicators related to the enhancement of national science and technology capability, the establishment of industrial competitiveness and the improvement of the quality of life, and this analysis produced significantly positive conclusions. In particular, it was discovered that these projects were highly effective in laying the basis for R&D input, facilitating R&D activities and inducing further R&D endeavours in the category of enhancing national science and technology capability, which is also one of the major purposes of these projects. In the category of establishing industrial competitiveness, these projects were tremendously effective in helping participating enterprises improve their response to market changes and in enhancing corporate reputation [13] . Still yet, this analytical study was limited in that it relied on qualitative surveys that focused mainly on the rippling effects of these projects.
Analysis of the G7 Program on its Effectiveness of Technology Transfer
Analyzing the success rate of G7 projects is significantly meaningful in that this examines the NRDP's effectiveness of technology transfer from the viewpoint of transfer of aggregate stock. The time scope of this analysis was set between 1995 and 2015, which is also the time period of the 1 st Science and Technology (S&T) Foresight Study. Here, the year 1995 corresponds to the 2 nd phase of the G7 Program and the official adoption of strategic S&T planning methods (e.g. future foresight) on a governmental level. The G7 projects' success rate analysis was designed to look at the technology foresight results used in the 2 nd project planning phase of the G7 Program, and to examine the level of realization of those predicted technologies at the current time point in order to identify the success rate (effectiveness) of these projects. In conducting this study, analyzing these success rates was based on the assessment outcome data that, as a result of the 4 th S&T Foresight Study, showed to what extent those future technologies, predicted by the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, were realized, and these outcome data were matched to the list of G7 projects.
One of the assumptions for this study was that out of the future technologies identified during the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, those developed via the G7 Program and those that were not were different in their rate and time of realization due to multiple factors (increases in investment, concentration of resources, and stronger industry-academia-research institute cooperation), and that the greater these gaps were, the more successful G7 projects were.
As a result of the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, a total of 1,174 future technologies were identified. Some of these technologies were excluded as assessing the time-point of their realization was believed to be impossible, which reduced the number of future technologies subject to the analysis to 1,109 (94.5%). Meanwhile, matching phase 1 G7 projects to target technologies of the 1 st S&T Foresight Study revealed that 271 out of 1,109 technologies could be aligned as in Table 1 . In matching projects to technologies, it was discovered that some projects included just a few that could be aligned with technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, which is attributed to the distinctiveness in the scope and characteristics of respective projects. For instance, environmental engineering and ASIC highly differ in terms of research areas included in respective projects and the scope of technologies to be developed. This explains why big discrepancies exist in matching technologies related to specific projects to technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study. 49.1% Note) As for advanced materials in the fields of information, electronics and energy, the scope of this segment itself is highly far-reaching, and thus relevant technologies were aligned to specific areas of materials under the G7 Program Out of these 271 technologies that could be aligned with the G7 Program, as many as 133 technologies or 49.1% of the total were realized prior to the foresight period according to this study. This number is approximately 7% higher than 42.4% that was confirmed as a result of assessing the realization of technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, which demonstrates that those technologies developed by the G7 Program were realized relatively faster than those that were not. While partial realization was included in the scope of assessing the realization of technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, such partial realization was excluded in reviewing G7 projects. This is because of the presumption that R&D outcomes should be realized to a level where they can be put to practical applications due to the inherent characteristics of the projects, and thus partial realization was not granted any meaning. Partial realization means that the concerned technology was the target of R&D with multiple purposes in mind and then only a portion of these purposes were satisfied. If you take as an example standard communication methods for factory automation(e.g. MAP network), these methods (standard communication methods for factory automation, MAP V1.0) were adopted by GM in 1984 but in Korea, only some technological progress was made and relevant technologies could not reach the commercialization phase Meanwhile, this analysis reviewed whether the success or failure of G7 projects resulted in any differences in terms of effectiveness of technology transfer or the realization of aggregate stock into technology transfer. As shown in Table 2 , the success of analyzed projects was determined based on feedback from several experts who were involved in planning and managing G7 projects as well as the outcomes of research conducted until recently. This was followed by making comparisons between successful and failed projects based on their realization, and their results are shown as below. Out of the technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, 17 of them were aligned with the G7 projects evaluated as successful(next-generation semiconductors, etc.), and 15 of these 17 technologies were realized. This is translated into the realization rate of 88.2%, which is tremendously higher than 42.4% shown as a result of the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1 st S&T Foresight Study as well as 49.1% which is the rate of realization of technologies aligned with G7 projects in Fig. 3 . In contrast, a total of 35 technologies subject to the 1 st S&T Foresight Study were aligned with the G7 projects identified as failures, and only 17 of them were realized, which is translated to the realization rate of 48.6%. While this figure is relatively higher than 42.4% confirmed as a result of the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1 st S&T Foresight Study, this is slightly lower than 49.1% which is the realization rate of G7 projects. 
Conclusions: Summary and Policy Implications
As Korea's investment in NRDPs is expanding to world-class levels, expectations for successful outcomes are increasing accordingly. Specifically, Korea's 'fast-follower' approach that values the investment of input and quantitative growth is now facing limitations, and the nation is exploring new pathways towards leading(creative) technological innovation(Creative Economy) while shifting its focus to qualitative growth. One key issue here is how and how fast Korea could transfer ideas or R&D outcomes into the commercialization phase, and such key issue for NRDPs would lie in the creation and use of research outcomes in their concrete form.
While studying the result of NRDPs has focused on output in measuring or evaluating their performance, few studies have been conducted on their effectiveness of technology transfer. Analyzing a wide range of previous research showed that taking the macro approach to review stock growth, rather than the micro approach, is more appropriate in analyzing the relationship between NRDPs and their effectiveness of technology transfer, and the conceptual analytical framework was designed as such.
In particular, NRDPs' effectiveness of technology transfer was understood as follows from the aggregate perspective by using as a proxy indicator the success rate of individual G7projects that were undertaken as large-scale, "mission-oriented", and government-wide national R&D projects.
First, those technologies whose R&D was conducted through the G7 Program showed a higher technological realization rate (49.1%>42.4%) than non-G7 technologies. This indirectly confirms that government-level assistance plays a relatively positive role in realizing any technology.
Second, those technologies that fall into the category of G7 projects that were evaluated as successful showed a significantly higher rate of realization than the rest subject to this analysis (88.2%>49.1%). This proves that there could be a fairly strong correlation between the creation of highly practical research outcomes and the realization of technology.
Third, even those technologies related to G7 projects that might be viewed as failures still showed a higher rate of realization than those technologies subject to the realization time assessment conducted as part of the 1 st S&T Foresight Study (48.6%>42.1%). This demonstrates that technologies that receive full governmental support with a strong policy commitment are more likely to be realized than those which don't benefit from such support.
Due to their inherent characteristics, NRDPs encourage governmental R&D investment in developing basic and fundamental technology and applied technology. Nevertheless, adequate funding is not readily available in developing commercialization technology or in the early commercialization phase by utilizing such fundamental/applied technology. This is attributable to the fact that NRDP investment is intensively focused on R&D endeavours themselves, and that there is a lack of recognition and investment in the follow-up process to transfer and commercialize R&D outcomes so that they fuel the growth of the nation's economy [14] .
Therefore, the Korean government is recommended to design NRDPs in a way to cross the 'Death Valley' that exists in the process of transferring and commercializing the outcomes of large-scale R&D projects. In other words, taking a strategic perspective from the phase of planning NRDP projects would be highly beneficial in creating a well-functioning linkage among R&D endeavours and the transfer of R&D results into commercialization & realization. This implies that such strategic viewpoint should be taken along the entire process of selecting, acquiring and using technology so that promising technology that may work in the market is identified, technology required for innovation is acquired through R&D and then acquired technology is fully utilized to generate outcomes. Furthermore, it is highly noteworthy that while researchers take the lead in undertaking R&D projects, a distinctive and separate strategic process needs to unfold systematically in order to commercialize acquired R&D outcomes. This is of utmost importance in strategically managing R&D projects, and presents significant implications for the current NRDP planning and management system whose main focus is on managing and improving the efficiency of R&D projects.
